This Monday in Frankfurt I presented a keynote lecture for the 51th Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft fuer Psychologie. I resisted the temptation to impress upon the audience the notion that they were all Statistical Sinners for not yet having renounced the p-value. Instead I outlined five concrete Bayesian data-analysis projects that my lab had conducted in recent years. So no…

Background: the recent paper “Redefine Statistical Significance” suggested that it is prudent to treat p-values just below .05 with a grain of salt, as such p-values provide only weak evidence against the null. The counterarguments to this proposal were varied, but in most cases the central claim (that p-just-below-.05 findings are evidentially weak) was not disputed; instead, one group of…

Across virtually all of the empirical disciplines, the single most dominant procedure for drawing conclusions from data is “compare-your-p-value-to-.05-and-declare-victory-if-it-is-lower”. Remarkably, this common strategy appears to create about as much enthusiasm as forcefully stepping in a fresh pile of dog poo. For instance, In a recent critique of the “compare-your-p-value-to-.05-and-declare-victory-if-it-is-lower” procedure, 72 researchers argued that p-just-below-.05 results are evidentially weak, and…

In his highly influential book ‘Wonderful Life’, Harvard paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould proposed that evolution is an unpredictable process that can be characterized as “a staggeringly improbable series of events, sensible enough in retrospect and subject to rigorous explanation, but utterly unpredictable and quite unrepeatable. Wind back the tape of life to the early days of the Burgess Shale; let…

With apologies to Bertrand Russell. John Tukey famously stated that the collective noun for a group of statisticians is a quarrel, and I. J. Good argued that there are at least 46,656 qualitatively different interpretations of Bayesian inference (Good, 1971). With so much Bayesian quarrelling, outsiders may falsely conclude that the field is in disarray. In order to provide a…

Tl;dr In 1847, Augustus De Morgan suggested that researchers could avoid overselling their work if, every time they made a key claim, they reminded the reader (and themselves) of how confident they were in making that claim. In 1971, Eric Minturn went further and proposed that such confidence could be expressed as a wager, with beneficial side-effects: “Replication would be…

“Anything is fair in love and war” — this saying also applies to the eternal struggle between frequentists (those who draw conclusions based on the performance of their procedures in repeated use) and Bayesians (those who quantify uncertainty for the case at hand). One argument that frequentists have hurled at the Bayesian camp is that “Bayesian procedures do not control…

Over the past year or so I’ve been working on a book provisionally titled “Bayesian bedtime stories”. Below is a part of the preface. This post continues the cooking analogy from the previous post. Like cooking, reasoning under uncertainty is not always easy, particularly when the ingredients leave something to be desired. But unlike cooking, reasoning under uncertainty can be…